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The Child-Schooling Effects of Microcredit:
Evidence from Cambodia
Kimty Seng†
This article analyses the effects of microcredit on child-schooling investment expenditure via formal 
and informal sectors by using data from the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey conducted in 2014. The 
analysis is carried out with an econometric approach that combines the endogenous treatment effect 
model and the bivariate discrete choice model to control for endogenous selection bias resulting from 
unobserved factors that potentially affect both/either households? uptake of formal and/or informal 
microcredit and household spending on child-schooling investment. The findings suggest that the uptake 
of formal microcredit is very likely to reduce child-schooling investment expenditure.
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1. Introduction
Microfinance?the provision of financial services offered by microfinance institutions (MFI)?is 
widely touted for its great potential to overcome the shortcomings of credit market for the poor in the 
developing world. Microcredit?the lending of small amount of money to the needy at the low 
interest?is the main element of microfinance and found to make a tremendous contribution to 
poverty reduction (e.g., Imai, Arun, & Annim, 2010; Montgomery & Weiss, 2011; Deloach & 
Lamanna, 2011; Imai & Azam, 2012; Imai, Gaiha, Thapa, & Annim, 2012; Kislat, 2015; Akotey & 
Adjasi, 2016) and enhance child education in developing countries (e.g., Behrman & Rosenzweig, 
2002; Maldonado & González-Vega, 2008; Becchetti & Conzo, 2014; Mazumder & Lu, 2015). It helps 
minimise households? socio-economic risk through producing women empowerment, relaxing credit 
constraints, acquiring needed inputs and necessary assets, and helping them in a timely manner to 
incur certain unexpected spending (Kulb, Hennink, Kiiti, & Mutinda, 2015; Akotey & Adjasi, 2016). It 
also allows the poor to take control of their lives and avoid less desirable factory jobs and insecure 
wage labour (Bornstein, 1996), by bankrolling microbusinesses, raising household income and 
smoothing household consumption (Seng, 2018b). Such a pro-poor mission is underpinned by the 
success of Yunus?s Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.
The formation of human capital is broadly expected to have main role to play in alleviating poverty 
which is the major challenge for the development (Bils & Klenow, 2000; Krueger & Lindahl, 2000). 
Nevertheless, in the rural communities of developing countries, children?s access to education remains 
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limited due to insufficient schooling infrastructure and resources (e.g., schools, teachers, materials), 
and the needy households? preferences and budget constraints for their investment in child schooling 
(Maldonado & González-Vega, 2008). Access to microcredit is likely to help reduce household finan-
cial constraints on child schooling. Human capital cannot be used as collateral because it cannot be 
seized in case of default, causing the poor to finance their children?s schooling investment through 
past wealth or abstention from current consumption spending rather than credit (Maldonado & 
González-Vega, 2008). Then, credit market shortcomings point up a joint causality between child 
schooling and needy households? income generation. Together with increasing returns on investment 
in education, the credit shortcomings are likely to plunge poverty-stricken households into poverty 
trap (Bardhan & Udry, 1999).
Literature has identified four main potential channels through which microcredit can affect child 
schooling (Maldonado & González-Vega, 2008). First, if households take up credit for income-gener-
ating projects with returns above credit cost (interest rate), the income augments. Under the parental 
altruism assumption (Basu & Van, 1998), the increased income is likely to allow them to overcome the 
threshold triggering parents? decisions to invest in their child education (Becchetti & Conzo, 2014). 
Nevertheless, if the returns are postponed in time, the income may fall and even do not increase in the 
short run due to loan repayment obligations. Moreover, parents may behave strategically towards 
household expenditure by not prioritising the investment in child schooling with the incremental 
income. Thus, the income effects on child schooling is determined by the bargaining between parents 
and children (Basu & Ray, 2002; Moehling, 2006). Second, if microcredit helps smooth household 
consumption (Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Khandker, 2005; Islam, 2008; Akotey & Adjasi, 2016), the 
borrowers would be likely to smooth consumption without dropping their children from school 
(Kanbur & Squire, 2001) or/and even reducing their spending on child investment. Third, it can 
enhance child schooling investment whenever empowering women who have stronger preferences for 
child education than do men (Thomas, 1990; Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Behrman & Rosenzweig, 2002). 
Fourth, if promoting household productive activities, it may increase the opportunity cost of 
dispatching children to schools (Becchetti & Conzo, 2014). Similarly, if it brings about an increase in 
parents? working hours, children may be deliberately or undeliberately forced to do household chores. 
In these cases, the use of microcredit increases the demand for child labour, thereby reducing child 
schooling or schooling performance (Jensen & Nielsen, 1997; Psacharopoulos, 1997; Psacharopoulos 
& Patrinos, 1997; Becchetti & Conzo, 2014).
Nevertheless, the most recent studies documented that microcredit is very likely to drift away from 
its social mission?generating income and employment, smoothing consumption, empowering 
women, and so forth?failing to hold its welfare-enhancing and poverty-reducing promise (e.g., 
Bateman, 2017; Seng, 2018a & 2018b). Using microcredit as a ?cure-all? to fight poverty has weakened 
rather than empowered women and has even trapped badly-off borrowers into a vicious cycle of 
poverty (Ganle, Afriyie, & Segbefia, 2015; Seng, 2018a & 2018b). Some other studies have found the 
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mixed impacts and yet advocated the use of microcredit as poverty alleviation strategy, arguing that it 
should be implemented with ?cautious optimism? (e.g., Banerjee, Dufio, Glennerster, & Kinnan, 2009; 
Karlan & Zinman, 2010; Duvendack & Palmer Jones, 2012). Such an unfavourable effect raises 
concerns over the effects on child education. Regardless of the controversial conclusions from these 
studies, which may illustrate the diverse settings because of the different methods and geographical 
focuses, evaluating the impacts remains nevertheless one of the most powerful tools for estimating the 
effects of microcredit on child schooling.
Microfinance in Cambodia has over the past two decades grown rapidly and has been argued to 
promote socio-economic development and to help alleviate poverty, in particular in out-of-the-way 
communities. In the early 1990s, the sector emerged from not-for-profit microcredit projects initiated 
by international donors and non-governmental organisations (NGO) with the purpose of creating jobs 
for demobilised soldiers and filling the nonexistent banking sector (Seng, 2018a). It has developed 
over time into more commercial and profitable models, in particular since 2000, the year when five 
major microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide an average microcredit of approximately US$ 137 to 
approximately 175,051 borrowers (Bylander, 2015). Five years later, it has nearly doubled in size (Seng, 
2018a), with 14 MFIs in 2005, 39 MFIs and 6 NGOs in 2014, offering microloans to approximately 
366,000 household borrowers in 2005 and to approximately 1,921,000 household borrowers in 2016 
(Lam, 2017). By 2014, 100,342 reported village offices operated nationwide (National Bank of 
Cambodia [NBC], 2014), with US$ 1140 average microloan (Seng, 2018a). Nevertheless, in 2018, the 
NBC shut down 32 MFIs on their request, after the NBC imposed the interest rate cap at 18 percent in 
April 2017. The improvement in rural livelihoods is partly attributed to the contribution of MFI 
microloans expanding cultivated land (Eliste & Zorya, 2015). Moreover, the extension of MFI services 
benefited approximately 3,878,618 Cambodians, or on average almost 5 people per household, 
allowing impoverished households to have easier access to microcredit to run new micro-businesses 
or/and expand existing ones (Cambodian Microfinance Association [CMA], 2018). Furthermore, it is 
argued by the CMA that the MFI microcredit is ?the key to breaking the poverty cycle? through 
empowering women as the household heads to run their own micro-businesses and manage cash. The 
MFIs in Cambodia and the CMA are optimistic about the MFIs? mission to lift the needy out of the 
poverty trap, in the rural communities in particular, through these ways and a substitute for the 
informal credit. Consistent with the findings by some empirical studies examining the socio-economic 
effects of microfinance in Cambodia that the MFI microloans contribute to poverty alleviation in rural 
localities (e.g., Teng, Prien, Mao, & Leng, 2011; Phim, 2014).
Nonetheless, the household borrowers are likely over-indebted, epitomised by the steadily rising 
ratio of average outstanding loan to GNI per capita, in particular from 2012 to 2014, with the higher 
rates than 100% (Seng, 2018a). Furthermore, alongside the growth of MFI microloans and poverty 
reduction achievement, the most recent studies (e.g., Bylander, 2015; Bateman, 2017; Seng, 2018a & 
2018b; Green & Estes, 2018; Bylander et al., 2018) found the unfavourable socio-economic effects of 
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MFI microcredit on household borrowers, doubting its human-capital-promoting effects. Microloans 
in Cambodia become a ?symbiosis of formal and informal lending? (Ovesen & Trankell, 2014), 
whereby the poverty-stricken borrowers take up both formal and informal microloans together, with 
the informal one being frequently used to meet the formal obligations (Bylander, 2015). Half of the 
MFI borrowers still took up loans from informal institutions, showing the MFIs? failure to ?elbow out? 
informal loans across the Kingdom (Renzenbrink, 2013; Song, 2013).
The controversial conclusions about the unfavourable effects of microcredit raise concerns about the 
child-schooling effects. The basic objective of the current study is to analyse the effects of microcredit 
on child-schooling investment expenditure via formal and informal sectors, with a particular attention 
to the issues of sample selection or endogeneity regarding the uptake of microcredit. A statistical test is 
conducted to indicate if the use of formal and/or informal microcredit enhances the child-schooling 
expenditure. To accomplish this objective, an econometric procedure that combines the strengths of 
the bivariate discrete choice and the endogenous treatment effects models (BDC?ETE) is adopted with 
data from the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) conducted in 2014. While Cambodia is one 
of the top five MFI penetration economies (Bylander, 2015), with 13 percent of the Cambodians 
actively taking up MFI microloans (Gonzalez, 2010),1 little is known about the pro-education effects of 
microloans. Moreover, this article contributes to the literature by using the BDC?ETE model to 
address endogeneity and other estimation challenges and also to describe the effects by formal and 
informal sectors at the household level. The article concludes that microloans reduce the household 
borrowers? expenditure on child-schooling investment.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical framework. 
Section 3 presents data and variables used in the analysis. Section 4 discusses the estimated results, and 
the final section concludes the article.
2. Empirical Framework
The empirical analysis in this article is carried out with an econometric approach that combines the 
bivariate discrete choice and the endogenous treatment effects models (BDC?ETE). A two-stage 
framework is used to estimate the models. In the first stage, the bivariate probit model describing the 
households? uptake of formal and informal microloans is estimated. From the first stage, two inverse 
Mills Ratios (IMRs) are predicted to control for potential endogenous selection bias. In the second 
stage, the estimated IMRs, together with two binary indicators representing the uptake of formal and 
informal microcredit and other regressors, are included in the education expenditure equation.
2.1. Uptake of Microcredit
Because the households are very likely to take up formal alongside informal microloans, the analysis 
of factors determining the uptake of formal and informal microcredit should be jointly carried out. 
That is, the uptake of formal microcredit would be correlated with that of informal microcredit. The 
determinants are built on the empirical models proposed by Akotey and Adjasi (2016) and scrutinised 
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with the bivariate probit model describing the households? uptake of formal and/or informal micro-
loans being specified as follows2:
M1*?α1 Z1?ε1; M1?1(M1*?0) (1)
M2*?α2 Z2?ε2; M2?1(M2*?0) (2)
E(ε1)?E(ε2)?0
Var(ε1)?Var(ε2)?1
Cov(ε1, ε2)?ρ
where M1* and M2* are binary indicators for the uptake of formal and informal microloans, respectively, 
with M1 being equal to 1, if a household uses formal microloan, and zero otherwise; and M2 being 
equal to 1, if a household uses informal microloan, and zero otherwise. Z1 and Z2 are covariates 
correlated with the uptake of formal and informal microloans, respectively. α1 and α2 are parameters to 
be estimated. ε1 and ε2 are error terms with a standard bivariate normal distribution. ρ is parameter 
capturing the correlation between Equations (1) and (2).
The bivariate probit model has four possible regimes: (1) the household uses both formal and 
informal microloans; (2) the household uses only formal microloans; (3) the household uses only 
informal microloans; and the household uses neither formal nor informal microloans. Thus, esti-
mating Equations (1) and (2) needs the identification of the probabilities that the household uses 
microloans in these possible regimes. The probability of each regime can be specified as follows 
(Greene, 2003):
P11?Pr(M1?1, M2?1|Z1, Z2)?F(α1Z1, α2Z2; ρ) (3)
P12?Pr(M1?1, M2?0|Z1, Z2)?F(α1Z1, ?α2Z2; ?ρ) (4)
P21?Pr(M1?0, M2?1|Z1, Z2)?F(?α1Z1, α2Z2; ?ρ) (5)
P22?Pr(M1?0, M2?0|Z1, Z2)?F(?α1Z1, ?α2Z2; ρ) (6)
where F(.) is the cumulative density function of the standard bivariate normal distribution. With these 
probabilities being specified, Equations (1) and (2) can be simultaneously estimated by using a 
maximum likelihood method with the log-likelihood function as follows (Greene, 2008; Chang & 
Mishra, 2008):
LnL?LnF [(2M1?1)α1Z1, (2M2?1)α2Z2, (2M1?1)(2M2?1)ρ] (7)
If the parameter ρ equals zero, Equation (7) is the sum of the log-likelihood functions of the tow 
binary probit models specifying the uses of formal and informal credit. Thus, a likelihood ratio (LR) 
test can be carried out, with the null hypothesis that ρ is statistically equal to zero, to justify if the 
bivariate probit model is better than the tow independent univariate probit models.
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2.2. Child-Schooling Effects of Microcredit
To quantify the child-schooling effects of uptake of formal and/or informal microloans, these two 
binary variables are regarded as the special treatments for the household borrower and are used for 
estimating a schooling expenditure function. Because individual household borrowers? child- 
schooling expenditure in the four possible regimes can be observed, the expenditure model is esti-
mated with endogenous treatment effects approach, accounting for the fact that unobserved factors 
may be correlated with both/either the use of formal and/or informal microloans and the expenditure 
(Chang & Mishra, 2008).3 Albeit at first used for the binary choices, this procedure can be generalized 
into multiple choices (Chang & Mishra, 2008). Either instrumental variables (IV) or control function 
(CF) approaches can be applied to the estimation of the endogenous treatment effects. Nevertheless, in 
terms of yielding consistent estimates, the latter is more efficient than the former (Vella & Verbeek, 
1999; Chang & Mishra, 2008). Then, this study adopts the CF approach to estimating the expenditure 
function.4
Although the CF method extends the sample selection approach, being applied to the whole sample, 
it is necessary to use covariates that directly determine the uptake of credit but not the schooling 
expenditure as selection instruments to properly identify the model. Imai et al. (2010) used the avail-
ability of formal banks in village as an instrument for the treatment effects model to evaluate the 
effects of microcredit on poverty. Following Imai et al. (2010), a dummy for availability of micro-bank 
offices in village (it equals 1 if the household lives in the village with at least one micro-bank office and 
0 otherwise) is used as the possible instrument in the current study. Then, this instrument is key deter-
minant of the uptake of microcredit because it facilitates the household access to formal credit but is 
very likely to reduce the use of informal loans. The study hypothesises that the availability of village 
micro-bank offices influences the household uptake of microcredit but does not affect the child-
schooling expenditure.
To account for selection bias, the generalized residuals, so-called Generalized Inverse Mills Ratios 
(GIMRs), are built for individual household decisions concerning the uptake of formal microcredit 
and that of informal one in the whole sample. These two GIMRs in the bivariate probit model for 
formal and informal microcredit can be obtained from the following (Greene, 2008):
     
   M α Z M α Z M α ZGIMR M Φ
F ρ
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1
1 1 2
2 1 2 1 2 1
2 1
. 1
        
＝ *
   (8)
     
   
*
         
＝
M α Z M α Z M α Z
GIMR M Φ
F ρ
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1
2 1
. 1
   (9)
where GIMR1 and GIMR2 denote the generalized residuals of individual household borrowers and 
non-borrowers of formal and informal credit, respectively. The coefficient ρ* is computed by the 
formula ρ*?(2M1?1)(2M2?1)ρ. Φ(.) and ϕ(.) are the cumulative distribution function of the stan-
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dard normal distribution and the standard normal probability density function, respectively. GIMR1 
and GIMR2 are included in the schooling expenditure equation as regressors to account for the selec-
tion bias and applying an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure to the estimation of the equation 
yields consistent and unbiased estimates (Vella & Verbeek, 1999; Wooldridge, 2015). Then, the expen-
diture model can be specified as follows:
Y?β0X?β1?M1?β2?M2?β1?GIMR1?β2?GIMR2?u (10)
where Y is the child-schooling expenditure. β0 is the vector of parameters to be estimated. X includes 
exogenous controlling factors expected to affect the expenditure. M1 and M2 are binary indicators 
specifying the household borrower?s decisions regarding the uses of formal and informal credit, 
respectively. β1? and β2? are the parameters to be estimated, capturing the effects of uptake of formal and 
informal microcredit on the schooling expenditure. u is the random error term.
In addition, there are two main statistical justifications for the effects given by the consistent esti-
mates of Equation (10). First, for the household borrowers taking out both formal and informal loans, 
it is whether the uses of formal credit and that of informal one produce the significant joint impacts on 
the outcome of interest, with the effects being tested under the null hypothesis: H0: β1? β2? 0. Second, 
the statistical evidence on whether there is a need to correct for the selection bias is necessarily 
provided to justify the consistent and unbiased estimates. Therefore, the null hypothesis: H0: β1??β2??0 
is tested to justify if M1 and M2 are correlated with the expenses due to unobserved heterogeneity.
3. Data and Variables
This section describes the source of data and defines main variables used in the regression analysis. 
The section ends by carrying out a descriptive statistical analysis, in particular with a simple statistical 
tests of the differences in means between households that take up microcredit and those that do not.
3.1. Data
The CSES data conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) in 2014 are used for the empir-
ical analysis in this study. Actually, the NIS has carried out the CSES since 1993, in particular the 
survey has been annually done since 2007. However, the 2014 CSES sampled up to 12,096 households 
in 25 provinces, while the survey sample in 2011?2013 and 2015?2016 counted only 3600 households 
each year. Thus, the 2014 CSES samples among the CSESs the largest size and can serve as the nation-
wide representative sample. Still, there are some missing observations in the regression analysis 
because some sampled households did not offer full information on the variables of interest related to 
the current study. Thus, adjusting for the missing, the total sample size is 8504 households for the 
regression estimation.
3.2. Variables
A binary variable for the use of formal microloans and a binary variable for the use of informal 
microloans are selected as the dependent variables in the selection equations. In the outcome equation, 
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the annual total expenditure on child schooling is used as the dependent variable.5 Following the most 
recent empirical studies (e.g., Akotey & Adjasi, 2016; Seng, 2018a & 2018b), a set of independent vari-
ables included in the regression equations consists of household characteristics, household head?s 
characteristics, farm characteristics, and financial characteristics of village captured by availability of 
micro-bank offices in the village.
Household characteristics include family members under 15 years of age, members over 64 years of 
age, working-age members (i.e., between 15 and 64 years of age), and remittances. The variable of 
family members under 15 years of age and that of those over the age of 64 years are incorporated in the 
models to control for the potential effects of household dependents on the household borrowers? deci-
sions to take up microcredit and the schooling spending. The variable of working-age members is 
included in the models to capture the potential influence of active family members on the decisions to 
use microcredit and the child-schooling spending. Furthermore, the remittances would facilitate the 
access to microcredit by helping remove household credit constraints (Akotey & Adjasi, 2016) because 
they are mostly used to meet debt obligations (Bylander, 2015) and equally raise household earnings 
and spending. Nonetheless, they can be used by the recipient households instead of microloans to 
incur other necessary household expenditure (Seng, 2018a) and/or child-schooling spending. In this 
case, the households is likely to make more investment in their child education.
Household head?s characteristics consist of age, gender and ethnicity. The heads are equally clus-
tered into four groups according the educational status?illiteracy, vocational training, primary 
schooling, secondary schooling, and higher education. In a similar fashion, the heads? occupations are 
grouped into five categories?farmer, agricultural wage-paid worker, nonagricultural salaried worker, 
professional (including lawyer, teacher, doctor, and other salaried employee), and other career (such as 
armed force, student, unemployed, retired person etc.).
The potential impacts of farm characteristics are captured by the variables of household landholding 
in hectares and availability of irrigation in the village. There may be a concern over the endogeneity 
issue of landholding. Yet, it is potentially low because the sampled households in this study represent 
those in the rural communities where the markets for land are underdeveloped (Azam, Imai, & Gaiha, 
2012). Nonetheless, although the households can put up land as collateral once applying for micro-
credit from the MFIs and/or moneylenders, the current study finds it difficult to hypothesise about the 
impacts of landholding on household decisions to take out microcredit and the schooling expenditure. 
In Cambodia, under the weather conditions there are 6-mohth wet season and 6-month dry season for 
the agriculture per year. Farmers very often see a water shortage due to the limited development of 
irrigation infrastructure in the communities. Hence, the availability of irrigation in the village would 
induce farmers to take up microcredit because the access to irrigation can encourage them to make 
more agricultural investments. Furthermore, it would facilitate the access to microloans through credi-
tors? expectation of the borrowers? higher agricultural yields (Seng, 2018b). All these variables are 
summarised in Table A1.
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3.3. Descriptive Statistics
The results of descriptive statistical analysis presented in Table 1 indicate that approximately 21% 
and 25% of the borrowers use loans offered by banks/MFIs and NGOs, respectively?these loans are 
categorised as formal loans in the current study?while 54% remainders use credit provided by 
informal lenders such as their relatives, friends, moneylenders, traders, landlords, employers, and so 
forth to meet certain spending. These results indicate that the majority of borrowers take up informal 
loans. Further detail on microloans and households? borrowing purpose by sectors can be found in 
Table A2.
The summary statistics reported in Table 2 illus-
trate remarkable differences between the borrowers 
and the non-borrowers in terms of child-schooling 
expenditure in both sectors. With an average expen-
diture of approximately 503,670 riels (US$125.92) 
per year, the borrowers? child-schooling expendi-
ture in the formal sector is significantly lower than 
the non-borrowers? expenditure, with an average of 
approximately 559,560 riels (US$139.89) per year.6 
Similarly, with an average expenditure of approxi-
mately 576,140 riels (US$144.04) per year, the 
borrowers? schooling expenditure in the informal 
sector is significantly lower than the non-bor-
rowers? expenditure, with an average of approximately 851,680 riels (US$212.92) per year. However, 
these results do not necessarily reveal that using formal and/or informal microcredit reduces the child-
schooling expenditure due to such issues as the endogeneity of the decision to take up credit, which 
results from selection bias and household heterogeneity (Seng, 2018a).
Table 2.?Schooling expenditure by borrowing status
Variables
Borrowers Non-borrowers Differences in 
MeanMean SD Mean SD
Formal credit
?Schooling expenditure 503.67 1862.91 559.56 3126.33 ?355.89***
Informal credit
?Schooling expenditure 576.14 3059.18 851.68 2910.13 ?275.54***
Notes: The child-schooling expenditure is the total annual expenses in thousand riels.
*** denotes test statistic significance at 1% level.
Source: Author?s computation from the 2014 CSES dataset
Table 1.?Types of lenders
Lenders Percentage 
Formal 
Banks & MFIs 20.86%
NGOs 25.30%
Informal 
Relatives 22.59%
Friends 6.74%
Moneylenders 19.17%
Traders 3.40%
Landlords 0.17%
Employers 0.11%
Others 1.67%
Source: Author?s computation from the 2014 CSES dataset
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4. Results and Discussion
The descriptive statistical analysis suggests the significant differences in child-schooling expenditure 
between the household borrowers and the non-borrowers in both sectors. The econometric analysis is 
further conducted with BDC?ETE model to quantify the effects of microcredit on child education 
expenditure.
4.1. Determinants of Microcredit Use
Table 3 reports the estimated results of the bivariate probit model for both formal and informal 
sectors. The parameter ρ indicating the correlation between the use of formal credit and that of 
informal credit is significantly nonzero, showing that the use of formal microloan is dependent on that 
of informal one, furt her confirmed by the significance of likelihood ratio test of independence equa-
tions (i.e., Equations (1) and (2)). This result suggests that the two independent univariate probit 
models are inappropriate.
For the formal sector, the household head?s life-cycle impacts on the probability of using microloans 
are quadratic. The likelihood that the household uses formal credit increases but starts to gradually 
decline after the head reaches 52 years of age. This is confirmed by the significantly positive coefficient 
of age and the significantly negative coefficient of age-squared term. As he/she gets older, the head 
gains more experience and enjoys growing economic opportunities but starts to gradually lose those 
opportunities after the age of 52, then affecting the access to credit. Consistent with the findings by 
Seng (2018a and 2018b), the ethnicity has a significantly positive correlation with the uptake of formal 
credit, illustrating that Khmer-headed households are very likely to take up formal microloans to meet 
household financial needs. The heads? occupations such as agricultural and nonagricultural jobs, are 
very likely to increase the likelihood of using formal microcredit; however, households headed by 
professional person are very likely to decrease the probability of using informal credit. Furthermore, 
the head?s illiteracy, vocational training, primary and secondary education are likely to increase the 
probability of using formal credit.
Consistent with Seng (2018a & 2018b), the numbers of family members under 15 years of age are 
likely to increase the likelihood of taking up formal and informal microloans, while the members over 
the age of 65 years are likely to decrease the probability of using informal credit. Furthermore, the 
availability of village bank offices is also very likely to induce the use of formal microcredit but also 
increase the uptake informal loans. This result somewhat supports the arguments by Bylander (2015) 
that some Cambodian household borrowers use formal and informal credit together.
4.2. Effects of Microcredit on Child-schooling Expenditure
The effects of uptake of formal microcredit and/or informal microcredit on child-schooling expen-
diture represented by Equation (10) are reported in the last column of Table 4. Because the particular 
objective of this study is to quantify the child-schooling effects of formal and informal credit, the 
discussion of the estimated results starts with the test of hypothesis about these effects. The null 
hypothesis that the use of formal credit and that of informal credit have no joint effects on the 
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schooling spending (H0: β1? β2? 0) reported at the bottom of Table 4 is accepted. However, the signifi-
cantly negative coefficient of formal credit suggests that the uptake of formal credit is very likely to 
reduce the household borrowers? child-schooling expenditure. This result reveals that microcredit is 
unlikely to increase household income, smooth household consumption and empower women as 
documented by previous studies (e.g., Imai & Azam, 2012; Imai et al., 2012; Kislat, 2015; Akotey & 
Adjasi, 2016), but to reduce household spending on investments in child education. This result is 
Table 3.?Bivariate probit estimates of microcredit uptake
Variables
Formal Informal
Coef. SE P-value Coef. SE P-value
Age 0.02** 0.01 0.03 ?0.01 0.01 0.10
Age squared ?0.0001* 0.00 0.05 0.00004 0.00 0.62
Gender 0.09* 0.05 0.05 ?0.01 0.04 0.80
Ethnicity 0.55*** 0.11 0.00 ?0.05 0.08 0.50
Farmer 0.10 0.08 0.23 ?0.11 0.07 0.14
Agricultural worker 0.32** 0.15 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.43
Nonagricultural workers 0.17* 0.10 0.08 ?0.22** 0.09 0.01
Professional ?0.02 0.12 0.84 ?0.20* 0.11 0.07
Small business owner ?4.26 0.14 0.98 ?4.88 0.14 0.99
Other career 0.00 0.21 0.99 ?0.02 0.18 0.89
Illiteracy 1.01** 0.47 0.03 0.60 0.37 0.10
Vocational training 1.01* 0.55 0.07 0.08 0.48 0.87
Primary 1.11** 0.47 0.02 0.47 0.37 0.21
Secondary 1.11** 0.47 0.02 0.41 0.37 0.27
Higher 0.30 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.78
Members?15 0.09*** 0.01 0.00 0.04*** 0.01 0.00
Members?64 ?0.09** 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.91
Working-age members 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.15
Landholding 0.001 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.72
Irrigation infrastructure 0.00 0.05 0.98 0.07 0.04 0.10
Village bank offices 1.15*** 0.04 0.00 0.85*** 0.04 0.00
Constant ?3.43*** 0.52 0.00 ?0.83* 0.41 0.05
Observation 8504
/athrho ?1.03 0.04 0.00
LR test of indep. eqns rho?0 Prob?chi2?0.00
Log likelihood ?7373.27          
* denotes test statistic significance at 10% level.
** denotes test statistic significance at 5% level.
*** denotes test statistic significance at 1% level.
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consistent with unfavourable conditions for the socio-economic effects of microcredit under which the 
borrowers would be likely to drop their children from school (e.g., Thomas, 1990; Pitt & Khandker, 
1998; Kanbur & Squire, 2001; Behrman & Rosenzweig, 2002; Becchetti & Conzo, 2014). The result 
confirms the most recent findings by Seng (2018a and 2018b) that microcredit worsens household 
welfare and does little to reduce poverty in Cambodia. These unwanted effects produced by Seng?s 
studies can somewhat help explain these child-schooling effects of microloans. The negative child-
schooling effects can explain the fact that interest rate charged on formal microcredit is still too high 
(see Table A2) and the credit is used not for income-generating activities, coupled with borrowers? 
limited financial literacy.
As mentioned earlier, the main issue of interest is also to determine whether the endogenous selec-
tion bias happens between the uptake of microcredit and the expenditure under the null hypothesis: 
H0: β1??β2??0. The joint nonsignificance test result reported at the bottom of Table 4 suggests the 
absence of a self-selection bias issue accounted for by the GIMRs. However, the coefficient of each 
GIMR is significant at 10% level, revealing that either the decision to use formal credit or that of 
informal credit is very likely to be subject to a self-selection bias issue. Then, incorporating GIMRs 
into the schooling expenditure equation is more appropriate to secure the estimated result against bias 
and inconsistent issues.
Other explanatory variables are found to have a significant correlation with the expenditure. For 
example, different from expectation, the coefficient of household head?s gender is significantly nega-
tive, suggesting that households headed by women are unlikely to invest more in child education. The 
coefficients of heads? education levels, except for higher education, are significantly negative. These 
results are different from existing findings (e.g., Seng, 2015). These unwanted results can explain the 
fact that the expected private returns on child-schooling investment in are below parents? expectation 
in Cambodia, due to lower payment in labour market. Furthermore, the numbers of household 
members under the age of 15 years have a significantly negative correlation with the expenditure. This 
result can somewhat explain the fact that households with more children need to bear huger burden 
on household spending, reducing expenses allocated to child schooling. Nevertheless, the numbers of 
household members over 64 years of age and working-age members have a significantly positive asso-
ciation with the spending, illustrating these old household members and working-age members are 
likely to have an influence on households? decision to make investments in child schooling. The fact 
that working-age members are likely to increase child-schooling spending can somewhat relate to roles 
of remittances from working-age members working in either other urban areas or other countries 
(e.g., Bucheli, Bohara, & Fontenla, 2018; Binci & Giannelli, 2018).
5.?Conclusion
The different and controversial conclusions about the socio-economic effects of microcredit raise 
concerns about the consequences for child schooling. This article quantifies the effects of microcredit 
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Table 4.?Effects of microcredit on child-schooling spending
Variables Coef. SE P-value
Formal microcredit ?108.95** 57.55 0.05
Informal microcredit ?28.20 53.23 0.60
Age ?27.17 39.65 0.49
Age squared 0.07 0.27 0.79
Gender ?257.07** 119.20 0.03
Ethnicity ?1121.35 676.14 0.10
Farmer ?430.32 270.74 0.11
Agricultural worker ?351.83 265.81 0.19
Nonagricultural workers 104.24 506.44 0.84
Professional 417.94 290.37 0.15
Small business owner ?4805.99 3283.44 0.14
Other career 226.99 241.62 0.35
Illiteracy ?3309.38*** 484.83 0.00
Vocational training ?2837.06** 1115.92 0.01
Primary ?3654.05*** 679.36 0.00
Secondary ?3474.62*** 740.41 0.00
Higher ?286.25 339.27 0.40
Members ? 15 ?107.11** 39.37 0.01
Members?64 209.67* 113.49 0.07
Working-age members 257.38*** 16.30 0.00
Landholding 2.10 3.61 0.56
Irrigation infrastructure 18.92 113.72 0.87
GIMR1 ?2230.51* 1315.93 0.09
GIMR0 3050.03* 1774.90 0.08
Constant 5020.10** 2155.94 0.02
Observation 8504
Adj. R-squared 0.11
Joint significance testa 0.17
Joint significance testb     0.22
Note: dependent variable is household expenditure on child schooling per year.
a H0: β1??β2??0, the critical value F?1.53.
b H0: β1??β2??0, the critical value F?1.80.
* denotes test statistic significance at 10% level.
** denotes test statistic significance at 5% level.
*** denotes test statistic significance at 1% level.
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on household expenditure on child-schooling investment via formal and informal sectors in 
Cambodia, with special attention given to the endogeneity issue by applying BDC?ETE to data from 
the CSES carried in 2014. The findings suggest that the uptake of formal microcredit is very likely to 
reduce child-schooling investment spending. Overall results illustrate that microcredit has at best no 
impacts on child-schooling spending, and may have an adverse effect. These results are consistent with 
the findings by Seng (2018a & 2018b) that microcredit, both formal and informal, is very likely to 
worsen household welfare and do little to alleviate poverty in Cambodia.
The unwanted effects are likely attributed to the high interest rates and the households? use of credit 
for nonproductive activities. The high interest rates and the nonproductive use are more likely to 
plunge the borrowers into a vicious cycle of high-interest indebtedness, particularly when the earnings 
are too low to cover the credit costs (Seng, 2018a & 2018b). Seng (2018b) also attributed such an unfa-
vourable effect to borrowers? financial illiteracy. This reveals that, in line with the findings by Schicks 
(2013), Coleman (1999), and Pytkowska and Spannuth (2012), microcredit growth may give rise to 
over-indebtedness which imposes a heavy debt burden on the borrowers, then more likely to produce 
an adverse effect on child schooling. Therefore, the formal microcredit is unlikely to serve as a substi-
tute for the informal sector in Cambodia, harming human capital development. These results provide 
insights into how the expansion of microcredit affects child education and in particular underscore the 
need for a reconsideration of microcredit as a strategy to enhance sustained poverty reduction in the 
Kingdom.
To promote child schooling through microcredit, the policy should focus on credit costs and 
borrowings for the productive purposes, coupled with financial literacy enhancement. To reduce credit 
costs, a special attention should be paid to interest on loans. According to the studies by Shankar 
(2007) and Vong & Song (2014), transaction and administrative costs of supplying many microloans 
and monitoring many small borrowers are the major contributors to the high interest rates. Mobility 
technology can serve as a new approach to reducing MFIs? transaction and administrative expenses 
and in turns lowers costs of borrowing for the needy borrowers. In Cambodia?s microcredit market, 
the lack of transparency distorts the actual price of MFI credit. Borrowers, especially those with 
limited knowledge, are usually not aware of all the charges imposed on them or overall costs of micro-
credit (Seng, 2017); and thus the MFIs should be more transparent. Alternatively, an appropriate 
interest rate cap temporally applied to microcredit to be used for productive purposes, with a specific 
basis on which the cap is to be computed, should be taken into consideration in policy.
Finally, the article has its limitations in the data because the panel data are unavailable and the data 
used in the analysis are not ideal enough for estimating treatment effects. With accurate data, the study 
can be improved with more appropriate instruments to address the issues of endogeneity concerning 
microcredit when quantifying treatment effects. This is left for future studies when there are such 
better data.
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Notes
1 The highest MFI penetration country is Bangladesh (25%) followed by Bosnia Herzegovina (15%), Mongolia (15%), 
Cambodia (13%), and Nicaragua (11%) (Gonzalez, 2010).
2 In the first stage of the standard treatment effect model, a probit model is usually estimated (e.g., Chang & Mishra, 2008; 
Akotey & Adjasi, 2016) because the error terms ε1 and ε0 are assumed to be normally distributed with zero means and vari-
ances σ2ε1 and σ2ε0 normalized to 1 (e.g., Heckman, 2001).
3 If, for instance, households are wealthier, their spending on child schooling is higher, irrespective of whether they use loans 
(Seng, 2018a). These unobserved confounders would, in this case, result in biased and inconsistent estimates of the effects of 
credit if not controlled for.
4 The detailed discussion of the control function methods can be found in Wooldridge (2015).
5 The annual total expenses on child education, both formal and informal, include the payment for school fees, tuition, text-
books, other school supplies, allowances for children studying away from home, transport cost, gifts to teachers, and school 
building fund.
6 The amount is converted into US dollar at the exchange rate of US$1?4000 riels.
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Appendix
Table A1.?Variables
Variables Definition Mean SD
Dependent
Child-schooling expenditure Total annual expenses on formal and informal child education in thousand Riel 795.704 2942.981
Formal microcredit ? 1 if the household uses credit offered by MFIs and NGOs 0.179 0.384
Informal microcredit ? 1 if the household uses loans offered by informal financial providers 0.203 0.402
Independent
Age The age of the household head 45.528 14.069
Gender ? 1 if the household is woman-headed 0.216 0.412
Ethnicity ? 1 if the household head is Khmer 0.959 0.197
Farmer ? 1 if the household head is farmer 0.578 0.494
Agricultural worker ? 1 if the household head is agricultural wage-paid worker 0.045 0.207
Nonagricultural workers ? 1 if the household head is nonagricultural wage-paid worker 0.202 0.401
Professional ? 1 if the household head is professional 0.061 0.240
Small business owner ? 1 if the household head is small business owner 0.003 0.054
Other career ? 1 if the household head is other than these careers 0.020 0.139
Illiteracy ? 1 if the household head is illiterate (cannot read and write Khmer language) 0.246 0.431
Vocational training ? 1 if the household head joined any vocational training 0.008 0.086
Primary ? 1 if the household head completed primary education 0.443 0.497
Secondary ? 1 if the household head completed secondary education 0.291 0.454
Higher ? 1 if the household head completed higher education 0.018 0.133
Members ?15 Total family member under 15 years of age 1.528 1.288
Members ?64 Total family members over 64 years of age 0.212 0.491
Working-age members 15 years of age ≤ total family members ≤ 64 years of age 3.030 1.545
Landholding Land areas in hectare owned by the household 1.750 7.434
Irrigation infrastructure ? 1 if the household live in the village with adequate irrigation infrastructure 0.144 0.351
Village bank offices ? 1 if the household head live in the village with at least one micro-bank office 0.103 0.304
?Table A2.?Microloans and households? borrowing purpose by sectors
  Formal Informal 
Loans 
Borrowed amount (riel) 2,741,025.18 2,049,375.04
Outstanding loans (riel) 1,885,687.59 1,638,545.21
Monthly interest rate (%) 2.89 2.98
Duration (months) 8.61 8.87
Purpose (%)
Agricultural activities 30.49 24.22
Nonagricultural activities 12.13 8.01
Household consumption 35.94 39.44
Illness, injury, accidence, and so forth 6.23 13.42
Other urgencies 0.0001 0.08
Rituals (marriage, funeral ceremony etc.) 1.79 3.14
Purchasing/building dwelling 5.63 7.03
Purchasing durable goods 2.79 1.73
Servicing and existing debts 4.30 2.04
Others 0.69 0.90
Notes: The amounts are in Cambodian currency (riel).
Source: Adopted from Seng (2018a).
